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Abstract. Crew Resource Management (CRM) is the application of human fac-
tors knowledge and skills to ensure that teams make effective use of all re-
sources. This includes ensuring that pilots bring in opinions of other teammates 
and utilize their unique capabilities. CRM was originally developed 40 years 
ago in response to a number of airline accidents in which the crew was found to 
be at fault. The goal was to improve teamwork among airline cockpit crews. 
The notion of “team” was later expanded to include cabin crew and ground re-
sources. CRM has also been adopted by other industries, most notably medi-
cine. Automation research now finds itself faced with similar issues to those 
faced by aviation 40 years ago: how to create a more robust system by making 
full use of both the automation and its human operators. With advances in ma-
chine intelligence, processing speed and cheap and plentiful memory, automa-
tion has advanced to the point that it can and should be treated as a teammate to 
fully take advantage of its capabilities and contributions to the system. This area 
of research is known as Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT). Research on HAT 
has identified reusable patterns that can be applied in a wide range of applica-
tions. These patterns include features such as bi-directional communication and 
working agreements. This paper will explore the synergies between CRM and 
HAT. We believe that HAT research has much to learn from CRM and that 
there are benefits to expanding CRM to cover automation. 
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1 Why Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT)? 
For centuries, automation has been making humanity more productive. Historically 
this automation has chiefly replaced the brawn of human labor, leaving people as the 
brains. Recently, however, machines have been used by humans for increasingly cog-
nitive tasks. Computers can play chess better than humans. They can search the web 
to answer your questions. They can drive cars. But automation is not perfect. It is 
brittle, breaking, often catastrophically, when taken out of the “comfort zone” it was 
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designed for. It has crashed stock exchanges [1] and cars [2]. Self-driving cars still 
need to “phone home” when encountering a person directing traffic [3]. Aviation has 
not been immune to this increase in automation, from relatively simple autopilots to 
sophisticated flight management systems. These innovations have not always been 
smooth [4]; however, the development of automation as tools to improve flight safety 
and efficiency has continued. 
As the nature of automation changes, so should the role of the human when 
interacting with automation. Automation is moving from the realm of simple “tools” 
into intelligent cognitive agents that can function as teammates, similar to human 
teammates. Innovations in artificial intelligence as well as increases in the speed and 
memory of the underlying hardware have spurred this shift. Cognitive agents can now 
suggest courses of action, monitor the operator actions and physiology, and monitor 
the environment. With all of these new capabilities, work has begun to investigate 
how the relationship of the human and the automation can be shifted toward that of 
teammates to best take advantage of this phenomenon. This idea of Human-
Autonomy Teaming (HAT) goes beyond simply giving a person a computer. The idea 
is that humans and automation should work together the way (well-functioning) 
human teams do, bouncing ideas off of one another, backing each other up when they 
sense potential problems, and keeping each other informed of what they are doing. 
HAT is currently recognized as a promising solution to the problems of human 
operators managing increasingly complex work systems. A human-autonomy team 
has been defined as “the dynamic, interdependent coupling between one or more 
human operators and one or more automated systems requiring collaboration and 
coordination to achieve successful task completion;” [5] a definition that has been 
picked up by others [6, 7]. As such, it is being developed and pursued in many 
operational areas such as robotics [8], commercial aviation [9], and UAS operations 
[10]. 
Aviation, with its very systematic approach to safety, may prove to be both a 
source of inspiration for developing better human-autonomy teaming, and an industry 
where its benefits might be most profitably exploited. While computers have 
eliminated the need for the navigator and (together with an increase in reliability) the 
flight engineer, regulatory barriers have slowed the ascent of automation in the 
cockpit. Years of cultivating teamwork on the flight deck have contributed to 
aviation’s superb safety record. Here we explore potential synergies between the 
lessons the airline industry has learned from years of studying teamwork and this 
newer field of human-autonomy teaming. Can we make human-autonomy teaming 
more effective by looking at the aviation model? Can we introduce advanced 
automation to the flight deck more safely if we introduce it as a team member? In the 
cockpit, where the importance of teaming has long been understood, the skills 
necessary for good teaming and the training procedures for teaching those skills have 
been codified under the umbrella of Crew Resource Management (CRM). Here we 
explore the synergies between HAT and CRM that may allow these new 
computerized teammates to be incorporated into CRM and may improve HAT 
concepts by incorporating the lessons learned from the development of CRM. 
2 What is Crew Resource Management (CRM)? 
2.1 History of CRM in Human Teams 
What can we learn from CRM as it has been developed for human teams? Although 
the discipline has expanded to other high-risk high-reliability industries, the multi-
crew airline flight deck is where CRM has its roots. 
Risk management has always been the core task for an airline pilot. In the early 
days of transport aviation, risks due to mechanical failure were more prominent and 
aircraft were less reliable. The majority of threats were clear, and external to the 
human who was tasked with operating the machine. Early airline captains were solo 
performers whose technical skills were sharpened by absolute necessity. Their 
selection, their environment, and their culture reinforced strong, independent 
personalities and isolated, individual decision making. As large aircraft became more 
complex, a single pilot could no longer operate the aircraft. The crew compliment 
grew but was comprised of people who were still focused on individual tasks. As the 
job quickly became a more team-oriented endeavor, flight deck culture and nature of 
the individual pilot had not necessarily changed to reflect this shift. 
By the late 1960's and 1970's transport accidents due to mechanical failure had 
drastically decreased. Advances in aviation technology like jet engines, modern 
avionics, and increased automation, so lowered the accident rate that the majority of 
new occurrences were now found to be crew related. Thus, further safety 
improvement could most easily be found from within the human team [11]. Landmark 
accidents like UAL 173, caused by fuel exhaustion, and EAL 401, brought down by 
the distraction from a faulty landing gear indicator, highlighted the need for training 
on team leadership and decision making for multi-crew aircraft [12]. The rugged, 
isolated individual was perhaps not the ideal model for what was now clearly a team 
activity. 
A breakthrough study, conducted by Ruffel Smith [13] suggested a correlation be-
tween the leadership and communication style of the captain with overall crew per-
formance. Further research reinforced this hypothesis [14, 15], and during the 1980's, 
industry and government came together to form what was at the time, a new discipline 
of aviation team training called Cockpit Resource Management, or CRM. As it 
evolved and became recognized as applicable to the larger aviation community, it was 
renamed Crew Resource Management. CRM has been defined as “using all available 
resources-information, equipment, and people-to achieve safe and efficient flight 
operations” [16, pg. 20]. 
In the 1990's, CRM training programs were introduced at major airlines and in 
military aviation units. Many of the concepts originally trained were lifted from 
business school management training templates and were not particularly well 
received by pilots. The topics in these classroom seminars typically included 
assessments of personality and leadership style. While these assessments might have 
been good predictors of performance, they did not necessarily allow for actual 
behavioral change. The goal of the training was an attitudinal shift, but this was hard 
to measure and equally difficult to reliably move to the flight deck. 
Eventually, over the course of two decades, emphasis has shifted to identifying 
observable flight deck team behaviors (good and bad) that could be trained and 
evaluated in actual line operations. Task analyses were conducted at major carriers 
and research organizations. Both technical and CRM skills were identified and then 
used to create training in high fidelity, full flight, line-oriented simulations. These 
Line Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) events are now a primary means of 
introducing, reinforcing, and evaluating CRM skills [17]. CRM training today still 
includes an indoctrination seminar for new hires, but now CRM skills are embedded 
in all aspects of multi-crew transport training. They are trained and evaluated 
alongside technical skills at every training opportunity. Current CRM doctrine uses 
the concept of Threat and Error Management (TEM). This paradigm seeks to 
acknowledge the universal existence of human error and outside threats. TEM seeks 
to engage the team in actively searching for those threats and inevitable errors, then 
through use of CRM skills, to avoid, minimize or correct them. 
The goal of CRM is the optimization of the human team. Whether the task is 
performing a checklist, monitoring a standard operating procedure, leading the crew, 
or mindfully following the direction of the leader, the whole point is for the members 
of the team to form, and perform optimally, and in synergy. We will now look at 
recognized CRM concepts and tools that are trained to, and used by, human teams in 
aviation, with the intent of adapting concepts from this field to the optimization of the 
new human-automation team. 
2.2 Generally Recognized CRM Training Concepts for Human Teams 
Threat and Error Management. As noted above, Threat and Error Management is 
one recognized framework used to convey a common mental strategy for identifying 
potential threats to safe operation, for identifying potential errors, and for correcting 
them when they inevitably happen [17]. TEM defines a continuum of safety ranging 
from safe operations on one side to an undesired equipment state on the other (i.e. a 
series of errors has occurred and gone unrecognized and unmitigated so that an unsafe 
condition or accident has occurred). The goal of TEM is to always remain in, or return 
to, safe operations while avoiding an undesired equipment state. 
Avoid. Teams are taught that all operations have certain inherent threats. A threat 
can be internal or external to the team. These are identified and called out during 
briefing with the intent that this affords a greater likelihood that these dangers will be 
consciously mitigated by all members of the team. These known threats are to be 
avoided and a strategy for doing so can be articulated even before the team begins its 
task. Common threats might include a new or inexperienced team member (internal), 
or a hazardous weather condition (external). 
Repair. An important new implication of this model is that the team expects that it 
will make errors during the course of its action. In aviation training this was an 
innovation. Previous generations of aviation professionals were expected to perform 
procedures and tasks to near perfection. Individuals were likely to minimize or 
discount errors both in training and actual practice because there was a professional 
and social penalty for doing so. In the TEM paradigm, individual errors are expected, 
so team members may be more likely to call out their own errors and those of others 
with less stigma attached. While individuals are expected to make errors, the team as 
a whole is expected to respond to those and correct them before they lead to an 
undesired equipment state. 
Recover. Should the first two levels of defense fail to capture the inevitable errors 
and threats that a team is likely to encounter, an undesired equipment state may occur. 
The task then becomes recovering the operation to a safe state. It is expected that 
CRM skills be utilized to return to a safe operation. 
Verbalize Verify Monitor. One CRM tool used to capture and mitigate error is 
known as Verbalize Verify Monitor or VVM. Using VVM, the team member 
planning on taking an action first verbally states the intention of the action. This 
allows both the acting member and a monitoring team member to verify that the 
action matches the intent of current team goals. If that test is met, the action is carried 
out and the results can then be effectively monitored. 
Verbalize. A statement that focuses the team on the accuracy of the next action to 
be taken. This need not be a simple statement. Often, a question is appropriate. 
Especially if the initiator is checking the accuracy of their own perception. As an 
example: “I intend to turn right.” or “Is the next turn to the right?” may both be 
appropriate, depending on the verification goal of the person taking action. 
Verify. When an intent is stated, another team member is needed to verify the 
accuracy of the statement. The verification will usually also be stated but may be 
passed by non-verbal means if appropriate to the workload and situation. The 
important aspect is that another member is now engaged and their input is received 
and acknowledged. 
Monitor. This last step requires continued engagement of the team to ensure that 
the intent just stated and verified is actually carried out accurately. In the case of 
automation management, this is particularly useful during multi-step changes or 
complicated procedures. A simple aviation example might involve the pilot flying 
calling out an intended automation mode change, executing the change after ensuring 
the monitoring pilot is engaged, and then both pilots monitoring the results of the 
change for accurate results. This process is used not only in automation management, 
but in all aspects of team action. For instance, a flight deck team taxiing on an 
unfamiliar airport would use VVM to ensure the aircraft does not deviate from its 
cleared route (i.e. enter an undesired equipment state). Using VVM, the pilot steering 
would proactively call out each turn and holding point well before the action must be 
taken. This communicates intent, focuses the monitoring team member, and allows 
for checking of common situation awareness. VVM works to verify technical as well 
as non-technical tasks. It may even be used during briefing to verify and align team 
goals, or as a tool to engage low-response team members. 
Standard Operating Procedures. A common observation made concerning airline 
crews is that it seems remarkable that persons who have never met each other could 
come together in a very short time, form a team, and then operate a complex piece of 
equipment in a challenging environment. This seemingly remarkable ability lies in the 
training of those people to the same set of standard procedures. They have a reasona-
ble expectation of what skill level they will encounter, and indeed, after the advent of 
CRM, even an expectation of how they will be treated as the team forms and acts. 
Well known human factors tools like checklists, standardized callouts, and stabi-
lized approach criteria all fall into the category of Standard Operating Procedures 
(SOPs). Some of these tools have been around as long as aircraft have existed and are 
used in many other high-risk high-reliability activities. SOPs ensure that a known, 
safe, efficient set of actions is used to navigate through complex procedures that re-
quire great accuracy. At an airline, they are developed by expert teams and vetted 
through internal and regulatory processes to verify their worth and efficacy. 
SOPs are intended to be the familiar landmarks that provide reinforcement, guid-
ance, and reassurance during the progression of the project that is the flight of a 
transport aircraft. Until the advent of CRM, there was no SOP for the operation of the 
human team. Even with an extensive set of well-defined procedures for operation of 
the equipment, it is possible for a group of humans to fail in the execution of those 
procedures if they cannot work together. CRM, then, can be thought of as set of SOPs 
for operating in a team with other humans. When used by high-functioning teams 
employing a full pallet of CRM skills, technical SOPs are landmarks that appear as 
familiar signposts that are the culmination and verification of various team actions. 
Conversely, to low-functioning teams without a good grasp of solid CRM skills, these 
landmarks may come as a surprise, presenting last-chance safety backstops, rather 
than the mile markers of a safe operation. 
Systems Approach to Training CRM Skills (AQP and ISD). It is important to con-
sider how the different needs and existing skills of a particular organization influence 
the CRM training product. How does an organization identify the particular CRM 
skills and values it would like to emphasize, and how does the organization evaluate 
whether or not the program is effective? For airline operations, this process is codified 
by the FAA in two Advisory Circulars. One, FAA Advisory Circular 120-51E, con-
cerns CRM [18], the other FAA Advisory Circular 120-54A, concerns the Advanced 
Qualification Program or (AQP) [19]. The CRM publication outlines basic CRM 
training topics, and the AQP publication describes a systematic process for training 
and evaluating CRM skills alongside technical skills. 
For airline operations using an AQP, the requirements attempt to ensure that CRM 
skills and the resulting training program are tailored to that airline’s needs. A system-
atic approach is advocated called Instructional Systems Design (ISD). This model 
starts with needs assessment to see where the organizational baseline is. A training 
goal is then defined and objectives written to support that goal. Once training is writ-
ten and delivered, data is gathered to facilitate a process of continual improvement. 
2.3 Common Target Concepts for CRM Training 
In the airline industry, major airlines generally still present a CRM indoctrination 
seminar that includes some aviation human factors and an introduction to CRM gen-
eral concepts. This establishes that common vocabulary which is used for training and 
evaluation of the concepts and tools throughout a pilot’s career at a given carrier. This 
involves learning to operate the “human equipment” one is teamed with at the same 
level of proficiency as the mechanical equipment in use. Maximizing the team’s effi-
ciency and output is seen as being of equal importance to technical proficiency. How 
is this done quantitatively and what do those behaviors look like? An excellent sum-
mary of recognized CRM skills that might be generally trained to new hires and eval-
uated in experienced operators is found in the book Crew Resource Management [20] 
Below, we briefly lay out the CRM skills they identified. We will then discuss the 
synergy these CRM skills have with HAT and the potential benefits of expanding 
CRM to cover automation. 
Communication. Making sure that there is bottom up communication as well as top 
down is the core of all other CRM competencies. CRM training teaches techniques 
for clear communication. One example is the use of active listening, which is the 
mindful repetition of the sender’s message back to them as a check for understanding. 
Another is teaching common, simple communication models to team members. An 
example of a model that might be trained during a CRM seminar is a three step 
process in which communication has not occurred until 1. A message is transmitted, 
2. The message is received, and 3. Feedback is provided. Proactive communication 
utilized mindfully by all team member is essential for all other aspects of CRM to 
work. 
In a high functioning human team, a person who has important information makes 
sure that information is communicated. This is true whether that team member is a 
decision maker or a subordinate. Alternate modes and channels are attempted until it 
is clear that the communication has occurred. As human teams form, they become 
more efficient in their communication. They begin to learn how to communicate with 
the individuals they are teamed with and then adapt their style to fit the person and the 
situation. 
Briefing. Dedicated briefings are useful in organizing teams and maintaining a 
common plan so that actions are properly choreographed. A team leader may use the 
preflight briefing to set the tone of team interaction in addition to the simple passing 
of pertinent information. During flight, a pause to re-brief as conditions and goals 
change is also useful in quickly redirecting or re-focusing the team. Post flight 
debriefing is important in the continuing process of improvement for individuals, for 
teams that are likely to reform, and for the organization as a whole. 
Backup Behavior. While briefings and SOPs set out roles and responsibilities for 
each crew member, in well-functioning teams, task allocation is not absolute. 
Particular circumstances may result in one crew member’s assigned duties exceeding 
their workload capacity. Under such circumstances, workload should be shifted so 
that it is balanced across team members. This kind of transition can be seen be during 
an off-nominal flight deck event requiring a shift from nominal SOP duties to alter-
nate duties that compensates for the increased task complexity and better distributes 
the changed workload. For instance, the captain may assign the first officer both pilot 
flying duty and the task of communicating with ATC, a shifting of roles as the flying 
pilot would normally rely on the pilot monitoring for this task. Because of the off-
nominal (perhaps requiring someone to run a checklist and work on a change of desti-
nation), workload must be re-distributed. 
Mutual Performance. “To err is human.” CRM attempts to prevent human errors 
from resulting in incorrect actions through mutual monitoring among crew members. 
Crew members are taught to give and take advice in an open and non-judgmental 
manner. An important aspect of this is the VVM technique discussed in 2.2 above. 
Monitoring is also an important aspect of Backup Behavior. Crew members are taught 
not only to watch for individual lapses in judgment, but also their partner’s overall 
workload and mental state, and to offer greater assistance when a partner becomes 
overloaded. 
Team Leadership. While many of the CRM skills have the effect of making teams 
more egalitarian, there is still a recognized need for one person to be in charge. The 
desired goal of the leader is to ensure that all team members are used optimally, and 
that they are engaged both with the task and with the team. Good leaders organize the 
team in a way that makes appropriate use of each team member’s skill and ability and 
keeps them working together in a positive manner. For example, a good captain might 
have someone with more flight experience as a first officer, or might have a rookie. 
What is appropriate monitoring and mentoring in one case might be perceived as 
condescending and micromanaging in the other. It is the leader’s task to make this 
type of assessment and modify their interaction to obtain maximum results from the 
team. 
Decision Making. A key goal of CRM is to improve decision making by encouraging 
the consideration of multiple possible courses of action and assessing each using as 
complete a collection of information as possible. To do this, crew members are taught 
to bring up potentially relevant information and alternative actions, considering the 
possible consequence of each, with an attitude of “what is right, not who is right.” 
Task-Related Assertiveness. In order to maintain a collaborative decision making 
atmosphere it is important that team members develop an appropriate level of 
assertiveness. They must be able to communicate information and suggestions with 
persuasive logic while maintaining an ability to listen and be persuaded by other team 
members. This helps ensure that all available information is put on the table in a 
transparent manner when decisions are being made. In fact, it goes beyond this, to 
require team members to bring information forward even when it is not explicitly 
requested. Appropriately assertive input, particularly from subordinates, is key to 
sound communication. It is a cornerstone of good followership, the important but 
often neglected obverse to good leadership. 
Team Adaptability. Humans show a strong natural tendency to maintain a particular 
course of action, even when, from a purely logical standpoint, it no longer makes 
sense to do so (e.g, the sunk cost fallacy [21]). CRM attempts to counter this 
tendency, by encouraging continuous re-evaluation of the current course of action, 
recognition of possible threats to the current goals, and discussion of options. 
Shared Situation Awareness. Many of the skills discussed in this section can be 
viewed through the lense of developing an accurate shared awareness of the situation. 
Communication and briefings serve to keep crew members on the same page, with 
shared goals and a shared understanding of the environment so that they do not act at 
cross purposes. CRM skills related to monitoring, assertiveness and adaptability serve 
to maintain the accuracy of this shared understanding. 
3 CRM for Human-Autonomy Teaming 
Automation research now finds itself faced with similar issues to those faced by avia-
tion 40 years ago: how to create a more robust system by making full use of both the 
automation and its human operators. This section will examine two overarching HAT 
concepts that have been proposed and then looks at how the CRM skills identified 
above might be applied to a human-automation team. 
3.1 HAT Concepts Supporting CRM-like Behavior 
Bi-directional Communication. As with the VVM pattern in human teams, it is im-
portant to develop a style of communication that makes sure that information is com-
municated across all team members in human-autonomy teams. This pattern has been 
referred to as bi-directional communication [22]. For automation to participate as a 
teammate, it is critical to have a bi-directional communications channel. This will 
allow humans to team effectively with automation and allows the human (and 
automation) to question, share hypotheses, provide additional input, etc. just as human 
teammates would. This bi-directional communication is critical and enables many of 
the CRM elements to follow. It must be bi-directional to allow the pilot to input 
information into the system that the automation might not have access to via sensors 
or databases. For example, when deciding on an alternate airport due to a medical 
emergency, the pilot might know more about the medical facilities in and around 
particular airports than does the automation. For the automation to participate fully as 
a partner, it needs to share this information, therefore this channel needs to exist. 
Similarly, the automation needs to be able to alert, share hypotheses, level of 
confidence, etc. with the human teammate. This then, allows the human to better 
judge the value and understanding of the automation and trust appropriately. This is 
an example of transparency, being used to calibrate trust, enabled by bi-directional 
communications. Teammates often discuss options, brainstorm on solutions and 
openly discuss courses of action. For automation to be on a team, this bi-directional 
communication needs to exist. Bi-directional communication is key to solving a 
number of the issues typically found in highly automated systems. Bi-directional 
communication can make systems more transparent and less brittle and further can 
facilitate intent based interface design. 
Working Agreements. In human-human teams, SOPs provide both a level of pre-
dictability for how team members will react in a variety of situations, along with the 
ability to plan for many situations offline. Work in HAT has developed a concept 
similar to SOPs for use with automation [23, 24]: working agreements. Working 
agreements encapsulate goals, procedures, and division of responsibility into a pack-
age that can be specified offline and instantiated quickly in real-time situations. 
Working agreements specify who (automation or human, and, in the case of humans, 
which human) is responsible for performing various acts associated with a particular 
situation. This responsibility can be conditional. For example, the automation might 
be given autonomous authority to follow a route unless potential hazards are detected, 
at which point it might alert the human operator for verification that it should proceed. 
3.2 Developing CRM Skills with Autonomy 
As discussed in section 2.2 above, human teams are taught certain CRM skills that 
provide standardized mechanisms for using the situation specific SOPs to improve 
performance on certain measures thought to improve operational outcomes. Here we 
discuss how automation designed to work with bi-directional communication and 
working agreements can mirror those same skills. 
Communication. CRM in the context of human teams emphasizes the need for com-
munication to flow both up and down the chain of command. Our bi-directional 
communication pattern is designed to enable something similar between humans and 
automation. Part of the reason for CRM was that superiors do not always want to hear 
what their subordinates are saying and subordinates are often scared to speak-up. 
Analogous problems may occur between human and automation. While we can as-
sume automation will not fear speaking up, how can we make sure that the human 
listens appropriately? Some research indicates that manner in which information is 
communicated influences the degree to which operators accept and rely on automa-
tion [e.g., 25]; however more work is needed in this area. 
Further, just as humans must adapt their communication styles to their teammates, 
it may be appropriate to build similar adaptability into the automated team members. 
Just as humans must be trained to operate synergistically within their teams, perhaps 
automation should also be capable enough to recognize individual human style in 
order to maximize HAT performance. How will the automation provide a metaphori-
cal “touch on the shoulder” when its human partner is deemed not to be listening? 
Briefing. As with human-human teams, human-autonomy teams must share a com-
mon plan to assure that actions are properly choreographed. This goes beyond the 
flight plan to include alternate airports (depending on flight progress), weather, 
aircraft status, any potential areas of concern, and any issues that would normally be 
discussed with the crew. Digital representation of the flight plan exists and so is 
straightforward to transfer to the automation, however, other aspects may be harder to 
transmit. It may be necessary to build a “briefing interface” on top of the bidirectional 
communication channel to allow the crew to easily and fully provide this information 
to the automation. Such an interface would be a logical place to define working 
agreements between the crew and the automation. 
Here may be an ideal opportunity to build the human-automation team in much the 
same way as human-human teams are built. A briefing for a human team provides not 
only information transfer, but, importantly, affords the team an opportunity for each 
member to adjust team dynamics and to begin forming communication strategies. 
It is also important to consider that briefings do not only occur at the beginning of 
a task. High functioning crews use them to re-focus the team when the situation has 
changed and at the end of the mission to review lessons learned, both good and bad. 
These other modes of briefing may have utility in helping humans and automated 
team members align goals and adapt to each other. 
In addition, human also use briefings to assess one another and to modify their be-
havior to better conform to each teammate’s preferred style of communication or 
operation. Could the briefing opportunity for the automation to gather information on 
the human team member’s preferences? Perhaps the human team member might pro-
actively push this preference information to the automation as part of the briefing. 
One could perhaps envision an opportunity for carrying this information in a profile 
of some kind that could follow a human team member from station to station. 
Backup Behavior. SOPs help human team members anticipate the needs of others by 
providing clarity about each other’s responsibilities. CRM training teaches pilots 
formal ways to modify these responsibilities by shifting workload between members 
to create balance during periods of high workload or pressure while maintaining a 
clear understanding of who is responsible for what. Similar flexibility can be built 
into working agreements between humans and automation. As noted above, a key 
feature of working agreements is the ability to specify the conditions under which 
each party is responsible for taking certain actions. Stress and workload levels can be 
among these conditions. However, doing so requires that these levels can be sensed or 
conveyed to the automation without adding to the overall workload. Sensing raises its 
own issues; how does the operator know that the automation has sensed high 
workload and changed the task allocation? An alert or annunciation system would 
have to be very sophisticated to avoid distracting the operator in a high workload 
situation. Operators could initiate such changes vocally or with a simple interface 
such as a button or dial. This would allow the operator to control the timing of any 
task reallocation and assure that his or her situation awareness is maintained. Again, 
this is an opportunity for further research. 
Mutual Performance Monitoring. An important aspect of CRM is crew members 
monitoring the performance of other crew members. This is also true for automation. 
The automation needs to be able to monitor the crew; are tasks being performed in a 
timely manner, is the pilot planning and staying “ahead of the aircraft”? 
As in the CRM construct of TEM, errors should be expected, recognized, and 
mitigated as necessary. Humans find a variety of ways to begin monitoring each 
other’s actions. Indeed, they start to monitor the quality of team interaction as well. In 
high-functioning human teams, members quickly learn each other’s style. Even on a 
short mission, with formerly unfamiliar teammates, this information about how the 
other operates may provide enhanced monitoring ability. HAT monitoring of error 
and compliance may benefit from perception of, and adjustment to, these individual 
human characteristics and preferences. 
An extreme case of required monitoring would be for nefarious behaviors. In 
human teams, much of this kind of screening is accomplished as the team forms and 
briefs. Under HAT, we would expect that under most circumstances, the human 
would lead the team. However, if the pilot has significantly deviated from the flight 
plan without a plausible explanation, the automation may have the authority to take 
certain actions; contact air traffic control, company dispatchers or in extreme cases, 
take control of the aircraft. In addition, it may be necessary for the automation to 
monitor pilot physiological state; heart rate, blood pressure, eye gaze, etc. to verify 
that the pilot is fit and operating at acceptable levels of physiological states. This 
could become critical in the case of incapacitated pilots; the automation may have the 
authority to take control in certain situations. For either of these types of monitoring 
to occur, the automation needs insight into the actions on the cockpit and 
physiological sensors on the pilot/crew. 
Monitoring needs to bi-directional in nature. That is, the pilot/crew must be able to 
monitor the automation just as the automation monitors the pilot. To do so, the pilot 
needs insight into the automation. Transparency into the processing and decision 
making provided by bi-directional communication is critical to this monitoring. When 
the automation alerts the pilot or offers suggestions (e.g., alternate airports), the logic 
of the processing needs to be available for examination by the pilot. But, the need 
goes even further, the pilot needs to have indications that the automation is 
monitoring and performing as intended. The bi-directional communication interface 
should be designed to provide this information. 
Team Leadership. For the foreseeable future, the pilot (human) will be the pilot in 
command and therefore the leader of this team, and thus ultimately responsible the 
performance of the team. However, automation can still fully participate as a 
teammate, as long as several of the attributes discussed thus far are in place; e.g., 
communications, monitoring, transparency. These will provide the leader the 
mechanism and the information required to direct and coordinate the activities of 
team members, encourage team members to work together; assess performance; 
assign tasks; develop team knowledge, skills, and abilities; motivate; plan and 
organize; and establish a positive team atmosphere. 
The coordination with the automation may be through working agreements. As 
with human teams, it is incumbent upon the leader to know the abilities of individual 
team members, and understand how to communicate effectively with them. In HAT, 
this may look like extensive training for the human team leader on the automated 
team member’s capabilities and limitations. In addition, it may be desirable for the 
automated team member to practice the analog of good followership as described for 
human teams. This might involve the automation retaining some capability to recall 
communication or interface preferences of the human team leader. 
Decision Making. Good decision making in human teams involves gathering and 
integrating information, identifying alternatives, and considering the consequences of 
each alternative. CRM encourages options developed by one team member to be 
evaluated and refined by other team members. This suggests that for automation to 
have good CRM skills it should be able to do three things that current automation 
typically cannot: evaluate options proffered by a human operator, give reasoning 
behind options it proffers, and compare options. 
Evaluation of options proffered by the operator might be facilitated with a “course 
of action scratch pad,” that would allow the operator to input a proposed course of 
action (e.g., commands, reconfiguration, or routing) and have the automation evaluate 
it, presenting predicted outcomes (e.g., risk assessment, estimated fuel usage, ETA, 
etc). Similarly, when proffering a course of action, automation should be able to give 
similar evaluations along with an indication of what options were considered in 
developing this course of action. 
Task-Related Assertiveness. A related measure of good CRM in human teams is the 
ability of members to communicate their ideas, opinions, and persuasively while 
remaining open to being convinced by the facts that other options are better. Working 
agreements can be used to implement such task related assertiveness in an automated 
system. A working agreement can specify conditions under which automation should 
“speak up” by alerting human operators to problems with the current course of action 
and/or offering alternatives. In addition, several channels for gaining the human’s 
attention may be desired. In human teams, a physical touch, a change in verbal tone or 
cadence, or even specific standardized phrases are all methods currently in use to gain 
the attention of a crew member who is not attending to a particular message. Some of 
these may translate well to automation while others clearly will not. 
Team Adaptability. In human teams, good CRM requires that the team be able to 
alter a course of action or adjust strategies when new information becomes available, 
rather than push forward with a suboptimal or even infeasible plan. Properly designed 
automation can help with this. While people are often reluctant to give up on a course 
of action once it is embarked upon, automation has no such limits as long as it is 
running open loop. Automation can detect when the current course has become 
suboptimal and propose deviations. To prevent the automation from overwhelming 
the human operator with new options (e.g., modifying an aircraft’s trajectory every 
time the wind shifts slightly), working agreements can be developed that limit 
proposals such proposals to cases where the risk or cost difference meets a certain 
threshold. Alternatively, a working agreement could be developed that gives the 
automation authority to make small deviations from the current course of action 
autonomously. 
Shared Situation Awareness. In human teams, it is important to maintain a common 
understanding of the task and team environment to keep everyone working toward a 
common goal. When new information becomes available it must be communicated or 
team members may find themselves working at cross purposes (e.g., if one pilot hears 
a controller say descend to FL270 and the other hears FL260). This issue is even more 
important in dealing with human-automation teams because the human and the 
automation do not innately have the same information available to them. The 
automation takes in data from various sensor feeds at a level of detail that, even if it is 
available to the human, the human cannot process. Similarly, the automation can 
make calculations much faster and more precisely than the human, allowing it to 
quickly recognize and react to changes in the environment. The automation may not, 
however have the full range of senses that the human has. This is particularly 
important when it comes to understanding other people who, in most cases, set the 
objectives of the system. The bi-directional communication channel discussed in 3.1 
above will be very important in allowing both the human and the automation to 
integrate this information and assuring that these representations are compatible. In 
some cases, it may be appropriate to “re-brief” as mentioned above in order to check 
for common goals and understanding of the mission. One could envision that this 
action could be called by either the automated component (if it senses that the human 
is taking inconsistent action) or by the human member of the team. 
4 Conclusion 
CRM has become deeply integrated into airline crew training. As automation rises the 
level of a teammate, it is imperative that this new status be reflected in CRM 
curriculum. It is recommended that airlines review their CRM training and 
incorporate this new more powerful automation paradigm as a critical component. It 
is perhaps equally imperative that research into CRM be incorporated into the design 
of these new non-human team members. The human-automation team should be 
developed in such a way that the human team member may eventually trust and 
interact with the automated team member in many of the same ways as they would 
with another human. 
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